> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.rated.network/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Slashing penalties

## Slashing on Ethereum

Slashing is the irreversible punishment that decreases a percentage of a validator’s current stake over time and forcibly ejects them from the network. It is the punishment given to validators who violate any of these three offences:

1. **Double Proposal** - proposing validator signs two different blocks for the same slot
2. **Surround Vote** - attesting validator signs a Casper FFG attestation (source `s` and target `t`) that “surrounds” another one, which contradicts what a validator said was finalized in a previous attestation

<Frame>
  $$
  s1 > s2 > t2 > t1
  $$
</Frame>

3. **Double Vote** - attesting validator signs two different attestations with the Casper FFG target

## Mechanics of Slashing

Slashing requires a whistle-blowing validator that monitors and reports on any of the three offenses listed. This whistleblower sends a message to the network outlining the offense. After which, the proposing validator includes this message in their slot. They then get awarded the offending validator’s balance divided by 65,536 (\~0.00048 ETH if the balance is 32 ETH). The reward is small since this is not meant to be a for-profit activity; rewarding reports as such would encourage false positive reports/spam. As for the whistleblower, they get the offending validator's balance divided by 4096 (\~0.00781 ETH if the balance is 32 ETH).

## Slashing Penalties

At a high enough level, so far we have observed slashed validators be subject to the following levels of principal loss across Beacon Chain eras:

| Upgrade era | Principal loss on slashing (approx.) |
| :---------- | :----------------------------------- |
| Phase 0     | 0.25 ETH                             |
| Altair      | 0.5 ETH                              |
| Bellatrix   | 1 ETH                                |
| Electra     | \~0.00781 ETH (32 ETH validator)     |

In the section below, we dive a little deeper in the formulas that modulate the level of principal loss for a slashed validator.

Slashed validator irreversibly exits the network during an epoch 36 days in the future. The slashed validator receives a minimal penalty at the point of whistle-blowing report.

* Pre-Altair: Slashed Validator’s Effective Balance \* 1/32
* Post-Altair: Slashed Validator’s Effective Balance \* 1/64
* Post-Merge: Slashed Validator’s Effective Balance \* 1/32
* Post-Electra: Slashed Validator's Effective Balance \* 1/4096

Following that, the slashed validator receives a penalty at the start of each epoch from the time of the report until the scheduled network withdrawal/exit.

* Pre-Altair: 3 \* Base Reward \* 32 (per epoch)
* Post-Altair: 40/64 \* Base Reward \* 32 (per epoch)
* Post-Merge: 40/64 \* Base Reward \* 32 (per epoch)
* Post-Electra: 40/64 \* Base Reward \* Effective Balance (per epoch)
* This penalty is higher if an inactivity leak is activated in the network.

Finally, the slashed validator receives a special penalty halfway between the point of the whistle-blowing report and at the point which the validator is forced to exit/withdraw (18 days).

* Takes into consideration the number of validators slashed during the period 18 days before the offending validator was slashed and 18 days after (aka 36 days before this halfway point)
* Maximum amount can be as high as the slashed validator’s total effective balance

**Pre-Altair:**

<Frame className="text-grey-800 dark:text-white text-xs overflow-x-auto lg:justify-start justify-center">
  $$
  \left[\frac{\min(3 \times \text{Total Balance}_{\text{Slashed Validators}}, \text{Total Effective Balance}_{\text{of the Network}})}{\text{Total Effective Balance}_{\text{of the Network}}}\right] \times \text{Effective Balance}_{\text{Validator}}
  $$
</Frame>

**Post-Altair:**

<Frame className="text-grey-800 dark:text-white text-xs overflow-x-auto lg:justify-start justify-center">
  $$
  \left[\frac{\min(2 \times \text{Total Balance}_{\text{Slashed Validators}}, \text{Total Effective Balance}_{\text{of the Network}})}{\text{Total Effective Balance}_{\text{of the Network}}}\right] \times \text{Effective Balance}_{\text{Validator}}
  $$
</Frame>

**Post-Merge:**

<Frame className="text-grey-800 dark:text-white text-xs overflow-x-auto lg:justify-start justify-center">
  $$
  \left[\frac{\min(3 \times \text{Total Balance}_{\text{Slashed Validators}}, \text{Total Effective Balance}_{\text{of the Network}})}{\text{Total Effective Balance}_{\text{of the Network}}}\right] \times \text{Effective Balance}_{\text{Validator}}
  $$
</Frame>